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CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN EUROPE AND THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES IN THE 1980's

A.

The Problem

Corporate governance has been discussed in Europe for over 150 years. 1
• Professor of Law, Tuebingen University, and Judge at the Court of Appeals, Stuttgart,
Germany. M.C.J. 1966, New York University; Dr. jur. 1967, Munich University; Dr. phi!.
1968, Tuebingen University. - Ed.
I. On developments during the first half of the nineteenth century, see Hopt, /dee/le und
wirlschaflliche Grundlagen der Aktien-, Bank- und Borsenrechtsentwicklung im 19. Jahrl1undert,
1338
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Indeed, in the 1840's, when the first Corporation Act was enacted in Prussia, three troubling features of the corporate organization form had already
been discerned: (I) the vulnerability of small investors who lacked the influence and sophistication to. control the corporation; (2) the risk to creditors
and the public created by the limited liability of the corporation, especially
when combined with inadequate funds and poorly controlled management;
and (3) the power that big corporations could amass economically, by
monopolizing markets, and politically, by exerting influence on public
opinion and govemment. 2
Today these features of the "modem" corporation - separation of ownership and control; the lack of "personal" responsibility vis-a-vis creditors
and the public, who bear the consequences of corporate decisions and corporate failure; and the ubiquitous presence of corporate power in what has
been called a "corporate society" - have been examined from both a theoretical and an empirical viewpoint in the United States as well as in Europe. 3 Yet, in spite of an endless number of reform proposals and a good
number of actual corporate law reforms,4 the problem of corporate governance remains acute. Indeed, the development of more complex corporate
structures, such as groups of companies, 5 and the appearance of transnational enterprises6 has exacerbated the problem. Legislators and courts in
in 5 WISSENSCHAFT UND KODIFIKATION DES PRIVATRECHTS IM 19. JAHRHUNDERT: GELD
UND BANKEN 128 (H. Coing & W. Wilhelm eds. 1980). On the period between 1860 and 1920,
see Hom, Aktienrechtliche Unternehmensorganisation in der Hochindustrialisierung (1860-1920).
Deutsch/and, England, Frankreich und die USA im Vergleich, in RECHT UND ENTWICKLUNG
DER GROSSUNTERNEHMEN IM 19. UND FRUHEN 20. JAHRHUNDERT 123 (N. Hom & J. Kocka
eds. 1979) [hereinafter cited as N. Hom & J. Kocka] (German with English su=ary).
2. See lnstruktion, die Grundsiitze in Ansehung der Konzessionierung von Aktiengesellschaflen betre.ffend, vom 22.4.1845, 1845 MINISTERIAL-BLATT FUR DIE GESAMTE INNERE
VERWALTUNG IN DEN KONIGLICH PREUSSISCHEN STAATEN 121 (concerning the practice
under the Prussian Corporation Act of 1843); R. von Mohl, Die Aktiengese!lscheften,
volkswirtschafllich undpolitisch betrachtet, 1856 DEUTSCHE VIERTEUAHRS-SCHRIFT pt. 4, at 1,
38, 52.
3. See, e.g., A. BERLE, JR. & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932); L. GOWER, J. CRONIN, A. EASON & LORD WEDDERBURN OF CHARLTON, PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW 49-57, 494-95 (4th ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as L. GOWER];
E. HERMAN, CORPORATE CONTROL, CORPORATE POWER (1981); E. MESTMACKER, VERWALTUNG, KONZERNGEWALT UND RECHTE DER AKTIONARE 78-89 (1958); R. WIETHOLTER, INTERESSEN UND ORGANISATION DER AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT IM AMERIKANISCHEN UND
DEUTSCHEN RECHT 270-338 (1961).
4. See L. GOWER, supra note 3, at 28-30, 39-57 (dis9ussing English reforms); 2 J. HAMEL,
G. LAGARDE & A. JAUFFRET, DROIT COMMERCIAL 1-16 (G. Lagarde 2d ed. 1980) (French); 1
H. WIEDEMANN, GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT: GRUNDLAGEN 24-34 (1980) (German).
5. See, e.g., M. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS
213-315 (1976) (as to the U.S.); 2 LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSES ON MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES: GROUPS OF COMPANIES IN EUROPEAN LAWS (K. Hopt ed. 1982) [hereinafter cited
as Hopt] (as to Germany, England, France, Belgium, Switzerland, Sweden, and the European
Communities); F. WOOLDRIDGE, GROUPS OF COMPANIES (1981) (as to Britain, France, and
Germany).
6. On the historical development of the transnational enterprise, see the series of contributions in Multinational Enterprises, 48 Bus. HIST. REV. 277-446 (1974); see also Hawrylyshyn,
The Internationalization of Firms, 5 J.W.T.L. 72 (1971). On the legal policy problems, see B.
GROSSFELD, PRAXIS DES INTERNATIONALEN PRIVAT- UND WIRTSCHAFTSRECHTS: RECHTSPROBLEME MULTINATIONALER UNTERNEHMEN (1975); Tune, Multi-national Companies in
French Law, in LAW AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE: FESTSCHRIFT FUR SCHMITTHOFF 375
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several European states are very conscious of the corporate governance
problem, but their responses to it have been dissimilar.

B.

The IJ!fferent Reform Strategies in European States

European states appear disillusioned with attempts at achieving better
corporate governance through increased shareholder democracy. 7 This is
hardly surprising, since, apart from the problem of the lack of sophistication exhibited by a broad stratum of the shareholding public, the cost-benefit balance for small shareholders of investing more effort in participation
and control is clearly negative.
Furthermore, although several European states have posited the need
for fundamental corporate law reform, 8 the likelihood of achieving anything more than piecemeal reform remains speculative. Although an exception is found in Switzerland, where revision of the corporation law is going
on slowly but steadily,9 Switzerland's unique tradition in the area of corporate governance explains this departure from the norm. 10 Thus, in the absence of convincing designs for new corporation law, most European states
experiment with rather concrete reform strategies, and in the process exhibit
their different theoreticiil' views of the corporate governance problem.
When grouped according to the control mechanisms chosen, the most
common of these reform strategies is to enhance use of the liability device.
The immediate targets of this device are management and the board of directors. In most European countries, the duties and liabilities of manage(Fabricius ed. 1973); Vagts, The Multinational Enterprise: A New Challenge for Transnational
Law, 83 HAR.v. L. REV. 739 (1969).
7. See, e.g., H. WIEDEMANN, supra note 4, at 352-53; see also M. EISENBERG, supra note 5,
at 19, 56-63 (as to the U.S.).
8. As to Great Britain, see L. GOWER, REVIEW OF INVESTOR PROTECTION (1982) (The
Gower Report was produced by a commission set up under the Secretary of State for Trade to
advise on the need for new legislation.). As to Germany, see the report of the Enterprise Law
Commission, a group set up by the Federal Ministry of Justice: BUNDESMINISTERIUM DER
JUSTIZ, BERICHT UBER DIE VERHANDLUNGEN DER UNTERNEHMENSRECHTSKOMMISSION
(1980) [hereinafter cited as the Enterprise Law Co=ission Report]. The Enterprise Law
Commission worked from 1972 until 1979, producing a report of over 1000 pages. However,
because it was composed of members of various factions and interest groups, it has remained
divided over nearly every major problem. For a critical evaluation of its work, see Kubler,
Unternehmensorganisation zwischen Sachverstand und Jnteressenpolitik, 10 ZGR 377-92 (1981).
Total revisions of the corporate law have been enacted in Germany in 1965, in France in 1966,
and in the Netherlands in 1970-1971.
9. Botschaft Uber die Revision des Aktienrechts vom 23. Feb. 1983, No. 83.015. This draft
law on the corporation (26th title of the Swiss Code on Obligations dating from 1936) contains
only those proposals that are considered indispensable, other proposals being postponed.
Some of the major targets of the draft law include investor protection, better disclosure, clearer
delineation of the competences and tasks of corporate organs, especially the board and auditors (Revisionsstelle), and corporate capital requirements.
In Belgium, a draft law on co=ercial companies was presented to the Parliament on
December 5, 1979, and is still under consideration by that body. See Lempereur, The Belgian
Bill to Amend the Corporation Law- New Perspectives for Belgian Securities Regulation, 5 J,
COMP. Bus. & CAP. MKT. L. 195 (1983).
l 0. In the context of merger control, see Schluep, The Swiss A ct on Cartels and The Practice
of the Swiss Cartel Commission Concerning Economic Concentration, in I LEGAL AND EcoNOMIC ANALYSES ON MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES: EUROPEAN MERGER CONTROL 123 (K,
Hopt. ed. 1982) [hereinafter cited as I EUROPEAN MERGER CONTROL].
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ment and the board are continuously refined by courts through legal
doctrine. France and Belgium, however, have developed the "action en
comblement du passif," 11 which can be brought against directors of a bankrupt corporation who, if found to have acted negligently, may be held personally liable not only for specific damages, but for all or part of the
corporate deficit. The philosophy behind this action is that the privilege of
incorporation with limited liability is not without bounds, and that the real
corporate actors should be required under certain conditions to back up
their actions with their personal wealth. 12
A more general reform strategy may be discerned in the new and intense focus on the functions of the corporate board. 13 It is well known in
Europe that the corporate board does not live up to the legislature's expectations with respect to the board's supervision and control of the corporation's management. 14 Thus, the attempt is being made to activate this
controlling function by giving boards greater rights to information from
management, 15 by discarding or mitigating the temptations of self-interest 16 and by imposing legal liability on directors.17
Not only is the corporate board's controlling function being revitalized
but attention has turned as well to those ''who control the tontrollers." This
attention has led to the imposition of liability on auditors and banks. In
11. See Art. 99 of the French Act No. 67-563 of July 13, 1967 J.O. 7059, 7065, 1982 D.S.L.
269, 275; see also B. MERCADAL & P. JANIN, SOCIETES CoMMERCIALES (MEMENTO PRATIQUE
FRANCIS LEFEBVRE), 1981-1982, at 928-31 (12th ed. 1981) (Nos. 3848-55: obligations des
dirigeants au paiement du passifsocial) (French case law). For Belgium, see van O=eslaghe,
Les groupes de societes et !'experience du droit beige, in Hopt, supra note 5, at 59, 92-94.
12. For the historical developments concerning this philosophy, see L. GOWER, supra note
3, at 43-57 (England). For an analy~is of the outer bounds of limited liability in modem
corporation law, see H. WIEDEMANN, supra note 4, at 217-36.
13. See CORPORATE GOVERNANCE - DIRECTORS' DUTIES AND LIABILITIES 15-18, 29-30,
113-16, 166-73, 429,449 (K. Hopt & G. Teubner eds. 1984) (papers to the International Colloquium in Florence, Apr. 13-16, 1983) [hereinafter cited as CORPORATE GOVERNANCE]; Papers
to the Congress on Corporate Governance, Paris, Mar. 9-11, 1983 (forthcoming).
14. In Germany, with its obligatory division between management board and supervisory
board, this had already been discussed extensively by the tum of the century. See A. CAHN,
DER AUFSICHTSRAT DER AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT 249-64 (1907). The development of the supervisory board in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries is treated by Hopt, Zur Funktion des Aufsichtsrats im Verhiiltnis von lndustrie und Bankensystem, in N. Hom & J. Kocka,
supra note 1, at 227. For Great Britain, see Wedderburn, The Legal Development of Corporate
Responsibility, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 13, at 20-32. Cf. A. CHANDLER, JR.,
THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS (1977); M.
MACE, DIRECTORS: MYTH AND REALITY (1971) (for the United States).
15. See, e.g., M. LUTTER, INFORMATION UNO VERTRAULICHKEIT IM AUFSICHTSRAT
(Abhandlungen zum deutschen und europiiischen Handels- und Wirtschaftsrecht No. 25,
1979); Mertens, Zur Berichtspjlicht des Vorstands gegenilber dem Aufsichtsrat, 25 AG 67 (1980).
As regards the flow of information to the board and the role of the accountant, see M. EISENBERG, supra note 5, at 186-211.
16. See K. Hopt, Se!f-Dea!ing and the Use of Corporate Opportunity and Information: Regulating Directors' Co'!flicts ofInterest, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 13, at 285-326
(Europe); Brudney & Clark, A New Look at Corporate Opportunities, 94 HARV. L. REV. 998
(1981).
17. In this regard, see the Schajfgotsch decision of the German Federal Court Judgment of
December 21, 1979. Bundesgerichtshof, W. Ger., 33 NJW (Vol. 2) 1629 (1980); cf. Ulmer,
Aufsichtsratsmandat und lnteressenkollision, 33 NJW (Vol. 2) 1603 (1980).
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Switzerland, a new body of case law holds corporate auditors liable in cases
of malfeasance. Is And in Germany, where banks traditionally play a key
role in the corporate proxy machinery and on corporate boards, this role is
being bolstered by the imposition of legal duties and liabilities on banks
and bank representatives in various corporate contexts. 19 This is quite unlike what the United States attempted to do with the Glass-Steagall Act,
which was designed to negate the role of banks on corporate boards. 2 For
Germany, it is safe to say that traditional corporate law and governance
cannot be understood without knowledge of the developments in banking
law. On the whole, however, none of these measures solve the problem of
corporate governance.
Taking into consideration the phenomenon of director ineffectiveness,
which in part seems but an outgrowth of the broader phenomena of organizational slack and bureaucratic inefficiency,2 I some European countries
have turned to the market to find a control mechanism. The market for
corporate control, which provides such a check, 22 has thus become the object of regulatory concern in Great Britain, France, and Belgium. These
countries have delineated the rights and duties of the participants in corporate takeovers, which are now supervised by state or self-regulatory bodies. 23 Germany, however, has not witnessed such a development: in
Germany, takeovers in general, let alone unfriendly ones, do not play a

°

18. In particular, see the decision of the Swiss Federal Court. Judgment of Sept. 23, 1980,
106 BG II 232, summarized in 70 DIE PRAXIS DES BUNDESGERICHTS 68 (1981); see also Forstmoser, The .Duties and Liabilities ofAuditors under Swiss Law, 5 J. COMP. Bus. & CAP. MKT.
L. 305 (1983). For Germany, see w. EBKE, WJRTSCHAFTSPROFER UNO DRITIHAFTUNO
(Schriften zum Deutschen und Europl!ischen Zivil-, Handels- und Prozessrecht No. 95, 1983).
For the United States, see Pitt & Williams, The Convergence of Commercial and Investment
Banking: New .Directions in the Financial Services Industry, 5 J. COMP. Bus. & CAP. MKT. L.
137 (1983). The system of all-purpose banking that is practiced in Germany, Switzerland, and
other countries has been the object of scrutiny as to its economic and legal implications. The
results of this scrutiny favor such a system so long as legal safeguards are maintained. GERMAN FEDERAL MINISTRY OF FINANCE, BERICHT DER STUDIENKOMMISSION "GRUNDSATZFRAGEN DER KREDITWJRTSCHAFT" (1979) (Banking Law Study Commission).
19. Examples of such contexts include use of the banks' depository vote; conflicts of interest of bank representatives on corporate boards; prospectus liability of banks; piercing the
corporate veil in the event of bank participation; fiduciary duties of banks to shareholderclients; and the duties and liabilities of banks involved with failing companies. See, e.g., Zeitschr!fl far dos gesamte Hande/srecht und Wirtscheftsrecht, 147 ZHR 165-222 (1983); 145 ZHR
177-272 (1981); 143 ZHR 113-226 (1979) (contributions to three Banking Law Symposia).
20. Banking Act of 1933 (Glass-Steagall Act), ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162, 184 (codified at various
sections of 12 U.S.C., including 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 78, 335, 377 & 378) (1982).
21. See J. MARCH & H. SIMON, ORGANIZATIONS 36-82 (1958); H. MINTZBERO, THE
STRUCTURING OF 0RGANIZATJONS 372-79 (1979) (discussing problems of coordination, discretion, and innovation, and the danger of dysfunctional responses).
22. To what degree it does so in reality is open to question. Available evidence shows that
quite often financially healthy enterprises are the target of tender offers. Furthermore, all real
markets are imperfect, and these imperfections are especially marked for capital markets in
Europe. See EEC COMMISSION, DER AUFBAU EINES EUROPAISCHEN KAPITALMARKTS (1966)
(Segre report).
23. See C. SCHMITTHOFF, F. GORE & T. HEINSIUS, DBERNAHMEANGEBOTE IM AKTIENRE~HT (Arbeiten zur Rechtsvergleichung No. 77, 1976) (takeover bids); Immenga, Ojfenl•
fiche l.fbernahmeangebote (Take over Bids), 41 Schw. AG 89 (1975); cf. Behrens,
Rechtspolitische Grundsatzjragen zu einer Europiiischen Regelung jlir l.fbernahmeangebote, 4
ZGR 433 (1975) (European harmonization).
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major role. 24
More generally, since capital markets can also act as a check against
inefficient corporate management by, for example, making corporate and
credit relations with banks more difficult, these markets have become the
object of regulation by laws and ongoing scrutiny by capital market commissions. Again, this is the case in France, Belgium, and, in a more complicated and self-regulatory fashion, Great Britain. In Germany, capital
market law is less developed and there is no body other than the stock exchanges in charge of supervising the capital markets. 25 However, Germany
has been the first to realize the significance of the relationship between corporate power and antitrust law, particularly merger control, by using antitrust law to control transnational enterprises.26
Improving corporate governance through market forces is, of course,
problematic. Unresolved questions include how to develop such market
forces if they do not yet exist or work satisfactorily;27 what is the right mix
between state regulation and self-regulation for these markets; 28 and how
state-controlled corporations, groups of companies, and transnational enterprises can be effectively exposed to such market forces. 29
At any rate, there is widespread conviction in Europe that these and
other means of controlling the performance of corporate managers and
board members - such as the use of contingent salary mechanisms, premiums, and stock bonuses - do not solve the problem, even though they may
be steps in the right direction. 30 This conviction has contributed to the willingness of various European states to experiment with labor representation
on corporate boards. Indeed, the idea of worker co-determination on the
board is widespread and has even reached a stage in which the European
Communities are considering making such co-determination obligatory in
one way or another for all member states. This movement finds its rough
24. In Germany, there are only nonbinding guidelines, which were reco=ended by the
Stock Exchange Experts Co=ission in January 1979. For the text and (short) commentary,
see BAUMBACH, DUDEN, & HOPT, HANDELSGESETZBUCH MIT NEBENGESETZEN (OHNE SEERECHT) 1059-63 (25th ed. 1983).
25. See F. KOBLER, GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT 365-75 (1981); Hopt, Vom Aktien- und Borsenrecht zum Kapitalmarktrecht?, 141 ZHR 389 (1977); Kohl & Walz, Kapitalmarktrecht als
Atifgabe, 22 AG 29 (1977).
26. See Hopt, Merger Control in Germany, in l EUROPEAN MERGER CONTROL, supra note
IO, at 71.
27. See Kubler, Unternehmensstruktur und Kapitalmarktfunktion - ifberlegungen zur Krise
der Aktiengese!lscheft, 26 AG 5 (1981).
28. See L. GOWER, supra note 8, ~~ 8.10-8.27 (self-regulatory agencies). In continental
European countries, especially Germany, the attitude towards complete self-regulation is basically negative, such as in the context of insider regulation.
29. Each of these organizations exhibits a strong tendency to insulate itself from outside
control, whether by markets or by law. In state-controlled corporations, this insulation stems
from the lack of responsiveness to financial pressures. In groups of companies, the specific
corporate structure facilitates insulation, while in transnational enterprises, the territoriality
principle and the differentials of nation-state regulation contribute to insulation from outside
control.
30. See Baellwieser & Schmidt, Unternehmensverfassung, Unternehmensziele und
Finanztheorie, in UNTERNEHMENSVERFASSUNG ALS PROBLEM DER BETRIEBSWIRTSCHAFTSLEHRE 645, 662-77 (K. Bohr, J. Drukarczyk, H.-J. Dru= & G. Scherrer eds. 1981) [hereinafter cited as K. Bohr].
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equivalent in the trend in the United States toward the appointment of
outside directors. 31 Both movements are characterized by high hopes, contrasted with an overall evaluation so far that may dampen these hopes.
Before turning to such an evaluation of the European movement, however,
this Article shall outline the most recent developments in corporate governance in the European Communities.
C.

Harmonizing Corporate Governance Rules in the European
Communities: The 1983 Draft of the F(fth Directive

After a sluggish fifteen-year period, the harmonization movement in
European company law gained momentum in the late 1970's. Already, six
company law directives based on article 54(3)(g) of the European Economic
Community (EEC) Treaty have been enacted by the Council and are binding on Member States. The core of the harmonization work concerning
company structure is contained in the draft Fifth Directive. The original
version of the draft presented by the European Commission in 197232 led to
great controversy in the European Parliament and in the Member States
because of its proposals on an obligatory two-tiered board, labor co-determination, and other issues. After ten years of deliberation, however, the
European Parliament gave its opinion33 and the European Commission responded quickly by presenting an extensively revised draft Fifth Directive
in 1983.34
The 1983 draft focuses only on stock corporations, where transnational
activities are predominant. For Member States like Germany, where other
company forms compete very successfully with the stock corporation, 35 this
31. See M. EISENBERG, supra note 5, at 144-46, 174-77; E. HERMAN, supra note 3, at 30-48,
281-83; Brudney, The Independent IJirector-Heavenly City or Potemkin Village?, 95 HARV. L.
REV. 597 (1981).
32. Commission Directive, Proposit!on d'une cinquieme directive tendant a coordonner Jes
garanties qui sont exigees dans Jes Etats membres, des societes, au sens de !'article 58
paragraphe 2 du traite, pour proteger Jes interets, tant des associes que des tiers en ce qui
concerne la structure des societes anonymes ainsi que Jes pouvoirs et obligations de Jeurs organes, art. 58, 15 J. 0. COMM. EuR. (No. C 131) 49 (Dec. 13, 1972). For reviews in English, see
Lang, The F!fth EEC IJirective on the Harmonization of Company Law(pts. 1-2), 12 CoM. MKT.
L. REV. 155, 345 (1975); Conlon, Industrial IJemocracy and EEC Company Law: A Review of
the IJrq/i F!fth IJireclive, 24 INTL. & COMP. L.Q. 348 (1975).
33. European Parliament Minutes of Proceedings of May 11, 1982, 25 O.J. EUR. CoMr,f,
(No. C 149) 12, 20-43 (June 14, 1982) [hereinafter cited as European Parliament).
34. Commission Preparatory Act, Amended proposal for a Fifth Directive founded on Article 54(3)(g) of the EEC Treaty concerning the structure of public limited companies and the
powers and obligations of their organs, 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 240) 2 (Sept. 9, 1983)
[hereinafter referred to as draft Fifth Directive]. For a first comment in German, see
Kolvenbach, IJie Flinfle EG-Richtlinie iiber die Struktur der Aktiengesel/scl1q/i (Strukturrichtlinie), 36 DER BETRIEB 2235-41 (1983).
35. In Germany, there are 2140 stock corporations, of which some 450 have their shares
quoted at the stock exchange, while there are 300,000 limited liability companies (GmbH, as of
1984). See IJer Aktienmarkl in der Bundesrepubik IJeutsch/and und Seine Entwick/ungs Mog/ichkeiten, MONATSBERICHTE DER DEUTSCHEN BUNDESBANK, Apr. 1984, at 12-21.
The number of partnerships with a limited liability company as the only fully liable part·
ner (GmbH & Co) is not recorded. On the resulting regulatory problems, compare Kilbler,
supra note 27, with Schmidt, Mehr Unternehmen an die Borse durch dllferenzierle Mark/organisation in 1981 HANSEATISCHE WERTPAPIERBORSE HAMBURG 4 (Annual Report of the
Hamburg Stock Exchange).
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restriction tends to widen the regulatory gap that exists between the different company forms and to intensify the movement away from the stock
corporation. Thus, the danger exists that the harmonization envisaged by
the draft Fifth Directive, which applies only to segments of the real enterprise world, may give rise to complacency.36 After all, regulatory goals
such as investor and creditor protection and management responsibility do
not lose their importance when an enterprise leaves the corporate form or
chooses another form from the start. In terms of the European theoretical
discussion, the slogan "from corporate law to enterprise law"37 reflects this
concern.
The European Commission has exhibited a clear preference for the German two-tier board system, not only because it appears to bolster the supervisory function in general, but also because the two-tier board is a much
easier target for the varying co-determination formulas. 38 Yet the Commission understood that it could not successfully promote its 1972 proposal of
an obligatory separation between a management board and a supervisory
board. Thus, the 1983 draft contains a compromise. The dual system is
introduced as a general rule, but each Member State may opt for a unitary
board system. This arrangement lasts for only five years, at which time the
Commission is to evaluate the system and decide whether further harmonization will be necessary. Given the realities of the present decisionmaking
process in the Commission, however, such a possible revision may be little
more than a face-saving provision for the Commission.
As a result, the draft contains elements of separation even for the optional unitary board system. Managing and nonmanaging members of the
unitary board must be distinguished. Managing members are to be appointed by nonmanaging members, and the number of nonmanaging members must be higher than that of managing members. All this is designed to
prepare the way for labor co-determination. Even the obligatory nomination of a member of the management board as the member who is primarily
responsible for labor relations is maintained under the unitary board system: this so-called labor director (Arbeitsdirektor) must be a managing
member of the unitary board. Member States that currently use a unitary
board system will undoubtedly realize that under these circumstances their
option to continue such a system under the Fifth Directive is little more
than nominal, and will react accordingly. In practice, however, the acceptance of the proposed reforms would result in less radical change than one
watching this harmonization struggle might expect, since in many large corporations the unitary board acts much like a supervisory board vis-a-vis
management.39
36. This danger has become real with the Fourth Directive Concerning Disclosure and
Balance Sheets, which does not reach the German GmbH & Co., see note 35 supra, even
though GmbH and GmbH & Co. are company forms that are in many ways equivalent alternatives for business. The German legislature does not intend to apply the Fourth Directive to
GmbH & Co., even though the resulting discrepancies are quite arbitrary.
37. Cf Enterprise Law Co=ission Report, supra note 8.
38. Co-determina!ion can be confined to the supervisory board, the functions of which are
undetermined, see note 14 supra, but which in any case do not include the whole range of
entrepreneurial decisionmaking in the corporation.
39. See L. GOWER, supra note 3, at 71 (England); E. HERMAN, supra note 3, at 30-48, 52.
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The other main controversy under the 1972 draft was labor co-determination.40 In this battlefield the Commission was forced to acknowledge the
political realities confronting its Member States and sound the retreat.
Thus, the draft provides for labor co-determination on the following terms:
The threshold for obligatory labor co-determination is a work force of 1000
or more employed within the same group of companies. Member States
may provide that the majority of the workers of the corporation can vote
against co-determination. This option is modeled after similar solutions in
Scandinavia and Great Britain and has been on the list of requests by the
European Parliament. If such a veto of the workers is not expressed, four
possible models of co-determination may be prescribed by the Member
States:
(1) Selection of at least one-third, but no more than one-half, of the
members of the supervisory board by labor. In the latter case ultimate decisionmaking power must lie with the representatives chosen by the general
assembly. This is necessary to make this model compatible with the German Constitution.41 Member States may also provide that no more than
one-third of the board members can be elected other than by the general
assembly or the workers, leaving open the possibility of a third group of
public-interest directors or state representatives, like that which exists in
certain French state enterprises, most recently in those enterprises nationalized in 1982.42
(2) Co-optation of new members by the supervisory board itself. In this
case, the general assembly and the work council have the right to appeal to
an independent state-appointed body. This model is a near total imitation
of the Dutch co-determination system.43
(3) Informing and deliberating with a separate labor representation
body within the corporation. This model has received attention in the
British reform debate44 and has parallels in Norwegian corporation
40. For a comparative law inventory as well as a critical appreciation of the different codetermination models and their difficulties, see Hopt, Grundprobleme der Mitbeslimmung in
Europa, 13 ZFA 207 (1982); Westermann, Tendenzen der gegenwarligen Mitbeslimmungsdiskussion in der Europaischen Gemeinschqft, 48 RABELSZ 123 (1984)
41. See Judgment of Mar. I, 1979, Bundesverfassungsgericht, 50 BYerfG 290, reprinted in
32 NJW 699 (1979). For a summary of this decision, see 28 AM. J, COMP. L. 88 (1980) and the
critical comment by Wiedemann, Codeterminalion by Workers in German Enterprises, 28 AM,
J. COMP. L. 79 (1980). For a much more positive view, see Simitis, Workers' Participation in
the Enterprise - Transcending Company Law?, 38 Moo. L. REV, I (1975). Most observers
today would say that one can live with the German Codetermination Act of 1976 and with the
Court's decision upholding it. See Part III i'!fra.
42. Blanc-Jouvan, La participation des lravailleurs a la geslion des en/reprises en droil franfais, in MITBESTIMMUNG DER ARBEITNEHMER IN FRANKREICH, GROSSBRITANNIEN,
ScHWEDEN, ITALIEN, DEN U.S.A. UNO DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND 33, 54 (Arbeiten
zur Rechtsvergleichung No. 92, 1978); Loi de nationalisation (no. 82-155 du l1 fevrier 1982),
art. 7, 1982 J.O. 566, 567, 1982 D.S.L. 92, 92.
43. As to the Dutch Codetermination Act of 1971, see Sanders, Employee Participation in
the Netherlands, 1977 J. Bus. L. 209. As to experiences with the Act, see Honee & De Groot,
The Appointment of Supervisory .Directors in Major Companies (Report in Dutch) (1979) (Summary in English) (Social and Economic Council, 's-Gravenhage 1979); Honee, Erfahrungen mil
der Koop/a/ion von Aef.richlsralsmitgliedern in den Niederlanden, 11 ZGR 87 (1982).
44. See INQUIRY ON INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY COMMITTEE, FIRST REPORT, CMD. 6706
(1977) (Bullock Report); Kahn-Freund, Industrial .Democracy, 6 INDUS. L.J. 65 (1977); Davies,
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law.45
(4) Introduction of co-determination either within or outside of the
board under terms that are the result of collective bargaining. Such a system is in force in Sweden46 and has had a strong appeal to the partisans of
labor co-determination in England.
From the compromises reached regarding two main areas of contention,
to wit, the propriety of a two-board system and of labor co-determination,
one might conclude that even if the draft is adopted by the Council, which
is hard to predict, the ambitious goal of European harmonization of company structure will be reached only to a modest degree. Yet such a conclusion is superficial for several reasons.
First, there exist many areas, such as the ambit of the general assembly
and the rights of shareholders, on which harmonization without hedging
will be reached. It is true that most of these areas are less conspicuous and
of a more technical nature than the propriety of a two-board system or of
co-determination, but corporate governance is reached only by a full configuration of many protective devices.
Second, one can hardly expect harmonization to be reached in a single
leap. Not surprisingly, company law harmonization shares the fate of European integration in general.47 The European Commission has favored
the only sensible route, taking the European bull by the horns and narrowing the options as far as possible: politics, after all, is the art of the possible.
Third, and most important, even a full harmonization of company law
and labor co-determination on the board would not ensure harmonization
of behavior, decisionmaking processes, and the locus of responsibility
within the corporation. Transplanting legal devices and institutions from
one country to another and from one socioeconomic context to another is
social experimentation with all its attendant uncertainties. This general observation applies with great force in the field of labor relations and co-determination.48 Indeed, full harmonization as planned in 1972 might lead to
less real homogeneity than that proposed in 1983, since in some countries
trade unions that are oriented towards conflict and class struggle in the
Marxian tradition may use co-determination in quite a different spirit than,
The Bullock Report and Employee Participation in Corporate Planning in the lJ.K, I J. COMP.
CORP. L. & SEC. REG. 245 (1978).
45. See Kolvenbach, supra note 34, at 2239.
46. See F. SCHMIDT, LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN SWEDEN (1977). For a rather
critical opinion, see Victorin, Co-determination in Sweden: the Union Way, 2 J. COMP. CORP. L.
& SEC. REG. 111 (1979). The most recent study is by economists E. Gerum & H. Steinmann,
Unternehmensordnung und tarifvertragliche Mitbestimmung in Schweden - Ein Beitrag zur
vergleichenden Unternehmensverfassungsforschung aus sozioakonomischer Sicht, 2 vols. (text
and materials) (DFG-Abschlussbericht Ste 97 /9, Mar. 1983) (report available from the German Science Foundation).
47. See generally R. BUXBAUM & K. HOPT, EUROPEAN INTEGRATION IN THE LIGHT OF
THE AMERICAN FEDERAL EXPERIENCE (forthcoming) (contribution to the Florence Project on
European Integration in the light of the "American Federal Experience") (directed by M. Cappelletti) (discussing the harmonization of company and capital market law).
48. See Summers, Worker Participation in the U.S. and West Germany: A Comparative
Study from an American Perspective, 28 AM. J. COMP. L. 367, 367-68, 391-92 (1980).
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for example, the German trade unions, which have been very successful
with co-determination.
II. THE MANY ROADS TO "INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY": POLITICAL
CROSSROADS TO WORKER CO-DETERMINATION

A.

Basic Strategies of Enhancing Labor's Influence on the Corporation

In European countries labor's influence on corporations has grown
steadily since World War I. This growth has not followed any logical sequence, since the development of labor representation on corporate boards
has not occurred as a result of rational decision, but rather through a process of political assertion and, compromise. One must take into account the
institutional framework within which such boardroom co-determination
has developed. 49
The main source of labor influence on the corporation has been collective bargaining. The preeminence of this mechanism remains unquestioned
even when other devices such as boardroom co-determination are requested
or obtained by labor. This does not, however, preclude conflicts between
collective bargaining and boardroom co-determination. 50 Indeed, the former is basically an adversarial strategy which includes such tools as strikes
and lockouts, while the latter can succeed only if practiced with a sense of
cooperation. It is precisely because of this conflict that boardroom co-determination has been denounced by some as the last trick of capitalism. On
the other hand, the scope of collective bargaining - the main, but by no
means exclusive, object of which is to fix wages - may expand if, as in
Sweden, it extends to various forms of co-determination within the enterprise and within the board. 51
More important than the body of law in this area are the traditions,
behavior, and goals of the trade unions in a particular European country.
Just as European and American trade unions are purported to be completely different, trade unions within the European Community vary widely
in character. 52
Work councils are found in most European countries. These councils
49. For the historical development of co-determination in Germany from the early nineteenth century until today, see MITBESTIMMUNG: URSPRUNGE UNO ENTWICKLUNG (Zeitschrift filr Unternehmensgeschichte Beiheft No. 19) (H. Pohl ed. 1981). For the socioeconomic
background in England, see Wedderburn, supra note 14. For a very sharp comparative study
of the institutional framework of worker participation in the United States and West Germany, see Su=ers, supra note 48. For Sweden, see F. SCHMIDT, supra note 46. Cf. INDUS•
TRIAL DEMOCRACY IN EUROPE (IDE), INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH GROUP, INDUSTRIAL
DEMOCRACY IN EUROPE (1981) (comparing the worker participation schemes in twelve countries); INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY IN EUROPE (IDE) INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH GROUP, EUROPEAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS (1981) (describing the various legal and socioeconomic
factors relevant to a comparison of the twelve countries studied).
50. See Summers, Codetermination in the United States: A Projection of Problems and Potentials, 4 J. COMP. CoRP. L. & SEC. REG. 155, 163-67 (1982).
51. For the ensuing, highly difficult problem of reconciling corporation law and these collective agreements, see Victorin, supra note 46, at 130-33.
52. See Wedderburn, supra note 14, at 19.
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are usually imposed by law, but may also be formed voluntarily. 53 They
are geared towards increasing the participation of workers at the plant level
in shaping the workplace environment. Accordingly, participation is organized from the bottom up, that is, at the shop-floor level. The participatory
rights of these work councils vary greatly. Depending on the country, work
councils range from the merely informational, to councils with obligatory
consultation and co-deliberation rights, and finally, to councils with full
participation rights and a veto in decisionmaking. Again, conflicts between
collective bargaining and work council participation exist, but they are usually mitigated by the legal priority of the former. 54
Labor participation from below implies at least indirect influence on the
level above, and decisions at the plant level ultimately affect the social and
economic policy of the enterprise as such. This observation, and the thrust
of the participation movement in the last decade, justify the conclusion that
participation necessarily transcends the plant level and plays a role in codetermining enterprise policy.55 Short of outright board room co-determination, such participation at the enterprise level may be practiced within a
system that fosters strategic informational exchange and consultation with
labor.
The organization and extent of this participation differ widely. In Germany, the economic committee of the workers must be informed in a timely
and thorough manner about a wide range of economic matters, such as the
economic and financial situation of the enterprise, the production and investments program, changes in the organization, and other plans that could
vitally affect the employees' interests.56 In Sweden, similar rights are given
to the trade unions in order to promote "informed bargaining." 57 In
France, the "comite d'entreprise" has recently obtained not only the right to
full information about the enterprise and its economic prospects but also
the right to present requests to and consult with the board. 58 Also, European countries are presently engaged in heated discussion concerning the
far-reaching information rights to be granted to the workers in transnational enterprises, particularly those working in subsidiaries with foreign
parents.59
53. Examples are given by Kubler, .Dual Loyalty of Labor Representatives, in CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE, supra note 13, at 431; Simitis, supra note 41, at 3-4.
54. For comprehensive legal information on many countries, see W. KoLVENBACH, EMPLOYEE COUNCILS IN EUROPEAN COMPANIES (1978). For an empirical study on the practice
under the German work council system, see H.U. NIEDENHOFF, PRAXIS DER BETRIEBLICHEN
MITBESTIMMUNG (1979).
55. See Simitis, supra note 41, at 7.
56. See Betriebsverfassungsgesetz arts. 106-111, 1972 BGBl I, pt. 1, at 13, 34-36 (W. Ger.).
For an English translation and commentary, see M. PELTZER & R. BOER, BETRIEBSVERFASSUNGSGESETZ/LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT 240-59 (2d. ed. 1977).
57. See E. GERUM & H. STEINMANN, supra note 46, at 54-56; if. L. GOWER, supra note 3,
at 68-69 (England).
58. See Loi no. 82-915 du 28 cictobre 1982 relative au developpement des institutions representatives du personnel, art. 29, 1982 J.O. 3255, 3263, 1982 D.S.L. 456, 463 (inserted into
the labor code art. 432-5 (new)); if. Viandier, La loi no. 82-915 du 28 octobre 1982 et le droit
des societes, 1983 J.C.P. I No. 25, at 3116 (ed. generale).
59. This is the so-called Vredeling-Proposal of the European Commission. See Commission Proposal for a Council Directive on procedures for informing and consulting the employ-
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These strategies combine with and culminate in labor representation on
the corporate board. Sometimes such labor representation on the board is
characterized as a German experiment. Yet, while it is true that this system
is most entrenched in Germany, various degrees of and formulas for worker
representation on corporate boards have been instituted in the Netherlands,
Denmark, Luxembourg, Norway, Sweden, and Ireland. 60 In 1982, France
took a step in the same direction. 61 Thus, labor representation on the corporate board can be fairly described as a European movement. Of course,
all these systems are instituted or at least supported by appropriate legislation, in stark contrast to the American case where Chrysler and the United
Automobile Workers (UAW) simply appointed UAW President Douglas
Fraser to the Chrysler board. 62

B. Trade Union Representation on Corporate Boards
One of the major problems of co-determination stems from the natural
antagonism between the trade unions, on the one hand, and the workers
and their bodies, on the other hand, that exists in the single enterprise or
plant. The development of work councils illustrates this phenomenon. 63
Employers have not always resisted the temptation to play work councils off
against trade unions. And trade unions themselves have often opposed the
development of a work council system, or at least a system that did not
incorporate their interests. For example, English trade unions were clearly
opposed to any kind of work council outside the trade union machinery,
while in Germany the work council system could be built up only after the
unions decided to use the work councils as their outposts in the plant. In
fact, in Germany eighty percent of council members and nearly all work
council chairmen today are union members.
The process of instituting boardroom co-determination has displayed
this very same tension. 64 In Germany, boardroom co-determination was
ees of undertakings with complex structures, in particular transnational undertakings, 23 O.J.
EUR. COMM. (No. C 297) 3 (Nov. 15, 1980). See also Birk, Unterrichtung und Anhonmg der
Arbeitnehmer in transnationa!en Unternehmen, in RECHTSVERGLEICHUNG, EUROPARECHT UND
STAATENINTEGRATION: GEDACHTNISSCHRIFT FUR LEONTIN-JEAN CONSTANTINESCO 33 (G,
L0ke, G. Ress & M. Will eds. 1983); Vandamme, L'ieformation et la consultation des trm•ail-

leurs dans la proposition de directive sur !es entreprises a structure complexe, en particulier trans•
nationale, 24 REV. MARCHE COMM. 368 (1981).

The European Parliament has recommended extensive modifications to this draft directive.
The European Commission has responded with a modified draft. See Commission Amendment to the proposal for a Council Directive on procedures for informing and consulting employees, 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 217) 3 (Aug. 12, 1983) [hereinafter referred to as
European Commission]. This new draft is commented upon by Westermann, supra note 40, at
169-79. For a complete documentation, see R. BLANPAIN, F. BLANQUET, F. HERMAN & A.
MoUTY, THE VREDELING PROPOSAL (1983); q: the critique in L'INFORMATJON ET LA CON·
SULTATION DES TRAVAILLEURS DANS LES ENTREPRJSES MULTINATIONALES (J. Vandamme ed.
1984).
60. See Hopt, supra note 40; see also Symposium: Worker Participation in Management, 4
COMP, L. Y.B. 3-163 (1981) (information on nine countries).
61. See notes 42 and 58 supra.
62. See Summers, supra note 50, at 155-56.
63. See L. GOWER, supra note 3, at 68-69 (England); H. WIEDEMANN, supra note 4, at 58788 (Germany).
64. The development of German legislation in the area of union representation is briefly

April/May 1984]

New Ways in Corporate Governance

1351

possible only because union representatives obtained up to one-third of the
workers' seats. As a consequence, German labor is represented by at least
some professional spokesmen who will look beyond short-term enterprise
interests to broader and more long-term work force and union interests. In
1983, for example, seventy-five percent of all labor directors were members
of unions belonging to the Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, and eight percent belonged to the Deutsche Angestellten-Gewerkschaft. Thus, German
unions have assumed a role in the enterprise whereby they take a certain
responsibility for the enterprise and its workers.
Direct union representation is difficult, however, if, unlike in Germany,
a large part of the work force is not unionized or there are many competing
unions in a single enterprise.65 Furthermore, both organization theory and
union practices show that the unions themselves do not always have a free
and democratic structure.66 This problem led the European Commission to
prescribe certain minimum standards for unions in its draft Fifth Directive. 67 Antagonisms between different layers of the work force, antagonisms between white-collar and blue-collar workers, and antagonisms
between executives with managerial tasks and the rest of the work force,
illustrate the difficulties here. In Germany, these difficulties have been resolved in the 1976 Co-determination Act by guaranteeing at least one seat
on the board to executives, while taking into account the interests of wageearning and salaried employees through the voting procedure. 68
C.

The Parity Problem

Organizing labor representation on corporate boards involves many
political decisions, as is illustrated by the options made available to the
Member States by the 1983 draft Fifth Directive. It is beyond the scope of
this Article to compare in depth the unitary system with the two-tier board
system, or the experiences of the Germa~ election model with those of the
Dutch co-optation model. 69 However, this Article shall address briefly
described in P. HANAU & P. ULMER, MITBESTIMMUNGSGESETZ § 7 No. 32-37 (1981). For
English developments, see L. GOWER, supra note 3, at 74-75.
65. Direct union representation is still possible in such a situation. See, e.g., Summers,
supra note 50, at 160-63 (United States).
66. For Germany, see R. MICHELS, ZUR SozJOLOGIE DES PARTEIWESENS IN DER
MODERNEN DEMOKRATIE (Krllners Taschenausgabe No. 250, 2d ed. 1970); H. STINDT,
VERFASSUNGSGEBOT UND WIRKLICHKEIT DEMOKRATISCHER ORGANISATION DER GEWERKSCHAFTEN (1976); see generally BEITRAGE ZUR SOZJOLOGIE DER GEWERKSCHAFTEN (1979).
For the United States, see Summers, supra note 48, at 385-91.
67. Art. 4(i) of the 1983 draft Fifth Directive requires the Member States to respect the
following principles: (a) labor representatives must be elected in a proportional representation
scheme with specific protection for minorities; (b) all workers must have the chance to participate in the elections; (c) elections must be secret; (d) free expression of one's opinion must be
granted. See draft Fifth Directive, supra note 34, at 10.
68. Mitbestimmungsgesetz [MitbestG] art. 15(2), 1976 BGBI, pt. I, at 1153, I 157 (W.
Ger.) (1976 Codetermination Act). The Act was pushed through by the liberal Free Democrats in the face of protest by the trade unions, which perceived the Act as threatening to the
homogeneity of labor. The Act has been justified by the idea that all three factors-capital,
labor, and disposition-are to be represented. The rule has made it necessary to alleviate the
strict incompatibility between management and supervisory board membership.
69. See notes 39, 40 & 43 supra.
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what has been the most controversial policy issue of boardroom co-determination in Germany, to wit, the parity problem.
The parity problem has been approached on three different levels. The
first is a philosophical one, and raises questions of what risks workers bear
within the corporation and what kind of influence corresponds to such riskbearing. Two opposing answers have been posited. According to one view,
the shareholders bear the entrepreneurial risk and therefore should have
the influence. According to another view, since the workers bear the risk of
losing their jobs, they are members of the company to a far greater extent
than the shareholders and deserve the lion's share of influence within the
corporation.70
A second level of the parity problem is legal-political. This level involves questions of what degree of influence in the corporation can be
achieved in the political arena, how the resulting compromise may be codified, and whether such law is compatible with the country's constitution.71
A third level of the parity problem involves issues such as how shareholders, management, and workers behave under a parity model; what economic and societal effects various models of underparity, parity, and
overparity may have; and whether the uncertainties involved in answering
such questions favor boardroom co-determination. The first attempts to address this level were made in Germany in 1970 by the BiedenkopfCommission; this attempt was based on the Commission's extensive use of
questionnaires and hearings concerning experiences with the full-parity
German coal and steel co-determination.72 Since the late 1970's, a growing
body of experiences with the quasi-parity co-determination under the 1976
Act has become available.73 Some of the most recent contributions are
made either by economists or by those writing with a socioeconomic perspective on the law.74
70. The first view is the conventional one. For the second view, see, e.g., L. GOWER, supra
note 3, at 10-11; Jonsson, Labour as Risk Bearer, 2 CAMBRIDGE J. EcoN. 373 (1978); Summers,
supra note 50, at 170.
71. This corresponds to most of the discussion led in Germany before the 1976
Codetermination Act and until the decision of the Federal Constitutional Court in 1979. See
note 41 supra. In the meantime (1984) German unions continue to ask for full parity and in
some socialist-governed German states, as for example Hamburg, they will get it on a voluntary basis in all state companies.
72. See Mitbestimmungskommission, Mitbestimmung im Untemehmen: Bericht der
Sachverst!!ndigenkommission zur Auswertung der bisherigen Erfahrungen bei der Mitbestimmung (1970) [hereinafter ''The Biedenkopf Report"].
73. See, e.g., MITBESTIMMUNG UNO EFFIZIENZ (F. J. S!!cker & E. Zander eds. 1981).
74. See generally K. Bohr, supra note 30; R. WICKENKAMP, UNTERNEHMENSMITBESTIMMUNG UNO VERFUGUNGSRECHTE (1983); G!!fgen, Zur vo/kswirtschafilichen Beurteilung der

Entscheidungstei/nahme in Unternehmungen: Die deutsche Mithestimmungsregelung als Beispiel,
in H. STEINMANN, G. GXFGEN & W. BLOMEYER, DIE KOSTEN DER MITDESTIMMUNO 9 (Gesellschaft, Recht, Wirtschaft No. 5, 1981); EIGENTUMSRECHTE UNO PARTIZIPATION (J,
Backhaus & H.G. Nutzinger eds.) (Frankfurter Abhandlungen zu den gesamten Staatswissenschaften No. 2, 1982).
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III. THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIETAL IMPACT OF LABOR
REPRESENTATION ON THE BOARD: MYTH, HOPE OR REALITY?

A.

Intra-Enterprise Effects

Labor representation on corporate boards that is mandated by law involves a choice of governance. Judging the impact of this choice is an uncertain and inexact "science." Thus, although lately implementation
research has become a major interdisciplinary effort, it has taught us to be
aware of methodological pitfalls and to dampen our expectations.75 Still,
legislators and lawyers must act in the face of uncertainty, while welcoming
whatever certainty may be gleaned from experience. In this field direct
causal relationships seldom exist, and the evaluation of specific decisions is
difficult. But it seems that, at least, impact tendencies are recognizable and,
even under the line of extreme retreat marked by van Hayek, that pattern
predictions are possible. Thus, it makes sense to discuss what players
should participate, and how to set the game or the market.76 This also applies to the task completion ability of alternative corporate governance
structures77 and to labor co-determination through which new actors are
introduced into the corporate board.78
Within the corporation, a first and rather obvious impact of labor representation on the board is the creation of an additional layer of control both
on the supervisory board and on management. In contrast to outside directors in the United States, who characteristically play a pai,sive role as invited guests "tied to the inside hosts by some sort of personal or business
relationship," 79 the worker-directors belong to different social strata and
have experienced a different socialization process than their co-directors.
In addition, worker-directors are on the board by their own right, as representatives of the work force, and through the union, to which they feel loyalty and by which they are controlled.80 Union representatives are usually
professionals like the other members on the board, while nonunion labor
15. See generally l IMPLEMENTATION POLITISCHER PROGRAMME, (R. Mayntz ed. 1980)
(Empirische Forschungsberichte); 2 IMPLEMENTATION POLITISCHER PROGRAMME (R. Mayntz
ed. 1983) (Ansl!tze zur Theoriebildung). For a recent survey of German contributions, see
Reese, Implementationsforschung, 1982 SOZIOLOGISCHE REVUE 4, 37-44.
For labor co-determination, see especially Gl!fgen, supra note 74, at 9-11, 14-19; Steinmann, Kosten-Nutzen-Analyse der Mithestimmung?, in H. STEINMANN, G. GXFGEN & W.
BLOMEYER, supra note 74, at 39.
16. See F. VON HAYEK, DIE THEORIE KOMPLEXER PHANOMENE (Vortrl!ge und Aufsl!tze
No. 36, 1972); F. VON HAYEK, Die Anmassung von Wissen, 26 ORDO 12-21 (1975).
11. See Williamson, The Modern Corporation: Origins, Evolution, A/tributes, 19 J. ECON.
LITERATURE 1537 (1981 ); see also Comment, An Economic and Legal Analysis of Union Representation on Corporate Boards ofDirectors, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 919 (1982) (attempting to apply
Williamson's approach to labor co-determination).
78. The following observations relate primarily to the large modem corporation under the
system of full parity (with a neutral eleventh board member) in the German coal and steel
industry, and under the general system of quasi-parity (i.e., representatives of the shareholders
having the last say by means of a double vote of the chairman of the board) under the 1976
Co-determination Act. A complex institutional framework is thereby assumed as a given. See
Part II supra.
79. E. HERMAN, supra note 3, at 48.
80. There are instances in which a labor representative on the board has been considered a
renegade and has been harassed by the unions and the press as a result of this branding.

1354

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 82:1338

representatives typically are not, compensating for their lack of professional
training with full-time devotion, training provided by the unions, and the
experience they have garnered at the grassroots level of the enterprise. Additional compensation is not an important motivating force for these
worker-directors, mainly because the unions have persuaded their members
to keep only a basic amount of their compensation and tum the excess over
to a union foundation. Status, influence, and career chances within the labor movement are more powerful incentives for serving as a workerdirector.
The worker-directors' monitoring function is facilitated by information
flows to which nonworker directors are not privy. This information emanates from the work councils, to which many worker-directors belong, and
from the unions, to which most worker-directors belong even if they were
not elected as union representatives. Of course, even if obstructionary tactics such as denying full and equal access to committee work are blocked, as
was recently done by the German courts, 81 this merely means an improved
possibility of monitoring by worker-directors.
Co-determination has clearly had an impact on board decisionmaking,
transforming and slowing down the whole process. A substantial number of
shareholders and board members asked by the Biedenkopf Commission
deemed this to be a significant disadvantage of co-determination. 82 While
these complaints were made in the context of the full-parity coal and steel
co-determination approach, the impact under the quasi-parity system is no
different since, much to the chagrin of the nonworker board members, the
worker representatives have overwhelmingly chosen to act as a clique under
this system. Thus, even under the quasi-parity system, the decision-making
process is complicated by the need for counter-fractionalizing, prior arrangements, separate meetings, adjournments, and group bargaining. And
although most decisions made by the supervisory board require careful deliberation, co-determination has contributed to the growing bureaucratization of the whole decision-making process, with its well-known spillover
effects.83 This slowdown and bureaucratization of the board's decisionmaking process is thus one negative effect of co-determination to be
weighed against the possible informational and motivational gains achieved
through worker representation on the board. 84
The effect of co-determination on the substantive decisions made by the
board is less clear, but certain tendencies can be observed. Co-determination has led to greater consideration of the societal impact of enterprise
decisions. Decisions concerning new investments, cutbacks or shutdowns of
works, geographical transfer of works, and other changes in the organiza81. Judgment of Feb. 25, 1982, Bundesgerichtshof, 83 BGHZ 106; Judgment of Feb. 25,
1982, Bundesgerichtshof, 83 BGHZ 144; Judgment of Feb. 25, 1982, Bundesgerichtshof, 83
BGHZ 151 (all W. Ger.).
82. See The Biedenkopf Report, supra note 72, at pt. III, No. 32. In the Netherlands, a

work council's complaint against a specific co-optation to the board was most often based on
not having been left enough time to deliberate. See Hom~e, supra note 43, at 99.
83. See Zander, Personalwirtschaflliche Konsequenzen der unternehmensverfassungsrechllichen Mitbestimmung, in K. Bohr, supra note 30, at 309, 326-28; see also note 21 supra.
84. See Glifgen, supra note 74, at 24.
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tion are acceptable for the labor representatives only if the social impact of
these changes is taken into account. 85 Thus, when Volkswagen planned to
open a subsidiary in the United States, labor feared that this would foreclose the creation of new jobs in Germany, or even lead to layoffs. As a
result, the final decision was blocked for two years, and consent was finally
given only in part and under the condition that there would be no layoffs in
Germany for a certain period of time and that further investment in the
United States would be subject to the prior consent of the board. Similar
effects have been noted in the area of dividend distributions. The worker
representatives on the board favor the retention of earnings rather than distribution to the shareholders, a position in which management concurs.
This effect of co-determination reinforces the tendency of German enterprises to keep dividends at a fixed and relatively low level, instead of giving
out varying dividends according to the year's business. Labor's concern
with the societal impact of enterprise decisions should not be construed as a
rejection of the profit motive, however. In fact, the Biedenkopf Report
could point to no case in which the profit motive was abandoned by a board
under the co-determination system. 86 And although cutbacks and shutdowns were delayed considerably, they were never finally blocked.
Finally, co-determination has exhibited effects on management, which
is nominated by the supervisory board. The shareholders' side rarely uses
its second vote to get its candidate nominated, since this would lead to a
deterioration of the cooperative climate within the enterprise and would
make it difficult for the manager to fulfill his tasks. Instead, prior agreement is nearly always sought and reached between capital and labor about
new appointments. Sometimes the shareholders' side gets the representative of the executives with managerial tasks to favor their candidate, as in
the recent appointment of the president of Daimler Benz, but even in such a
case a formal split of the labor faction hardly ever occurs. As a matter of
fact, the representatives of the executives with managerial tasks vote regularly with the other worker-directors, with occasional exceptions when the
above-mentioned Arbeitsdirektor is to be nominated. Such agreements between capital and labor have their price. In a number of cases, the candidate favored by labor is nominated. More significantly, the profile of
management changes. 87 New appointees must be acceptable to labor, who
will examine their attitudes and their prior record toward labor. This implies that top managers must attempt to establish and maintain good relations with labor if they want to be reelected in the same enterprise or to
have a chance to be elected in another enterprise that is subject to union codetermination. This effect of labor is even stronger on the member of the
managing board who is in charge of social matters and labor relations (the
Arbeitsdirektor), especially if the unions obtain veto power over this post.88
Whether the increased influence of labor under a system of co-determi85. See The Biedenkopf Report, supra note 72, at pt. III, Nos. 33-53.
86. Id at pt. Ill, No. 36. See generally D. BRINKMANN-HERZ, ENTSCHEIDUNGSPROZESSE
IN DEN AUFSICHTSRATEN DER MONTANINDUSTRIE (1972); W. TEGTMEIER, WIRKUNGEN DER
MITBESTIMMUNG DER ARBEITNEHMER (Wirtschaftspolitische Studien No. 30, 1973).
87. For the Netherlands, see Honee, supra note 43, at 98-106, 107.
88. See Zander, supra note 83, at 313-17.
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nation results in a greater acceptance of board decisions by workers, and
thereby has the effect of promoting intra-enterprise efficiency, 89 is not fully
clear. While there is empirical evidence of a correlation between participation and worker motivation, this evidence relates to the more direct participation of the single worker at his particular work place or, at the most, in
his plant. 90
B.

Effects on Markets and the Economy

Effects on markets and the economy from a system of co-determination
are probable, but somewhat difficult to confirm and describe. Some conclusions follow from observations of the intra-enterprise effects of labor codetermination, while others are more speculative.
To begin, however, the notion that co-determination mandated by law
rather than by market forces is inefficient91 must be discarded. This notion
not only ignores important _legal goals, but it fails to consider that although
individual actors in the market may be efficient in minimizing their own
transaction costs, they may also neglect externalities and the overall economic consequences of their behavior. 92
The clearest effects of co-determination are on the capital markets. As
previously noted, labor representatives on the board tend to reduce dividend payments to shareholders and, insofar as they have any influence,
favor higher salaries and social benefits for the workers. Furthermore, labor representatives tend to slow down and weaken management decisions
that may affect jobs and other labor interests. These effects are not without
consequences on the valuation of the shares of the co-determined corporation, even though these consequences may be difficult to prove empirically.
Even more important, however, shareholders will be reluctant to extend
more capital to corporations with a co-determination system and will instead look for other investments.93 Proposals to make the burden even for
all companies within a state are of doubtful merit, since there is always the
possibility of exporting one's capital abroad to a less regulated area.
89. See Glifgen, supra note 74, at 12, 19-20, 23; Steinmann, supra note 75, at 59-60; cf.
Cable & FitzRoy, Productive Efficiency, Incentives and Employee Participation: Some Preliminary Resultsfor West Germany, 33 KYKLOS 100 (1980) (discussing voluntary participation be•
low the board level).
90. See G. Teubner, Co-Determination Through Law: Social Functions of Law in Institutional Innovations 9-11 (European University Institute Paper, Florence 1982) (unpublished)
("somewhat depressing findings").
91. See Furubotn, Codeterminalion and the Efficient Partitioning of Ownership Rights in the
Firm, 137 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR DIE GESAMTE STAATSWISSENSCHAFT 702, 705 (1981); Jensen &
Meckling, Rights and Production Functions: An Application lo Labor-managed Firms and
Codeterminalion, 52 J. Bus. 469,473 (1979); Pejovich, Codetermination: A New Perspectivefor
the West, in THE CODETERMINATION MOVEMENT IN THE WEST 3, 16-20 (S. Pejovich ed. 1978).
92. See Brinkmann & Kobler, Uber!egungen mr okonomischen Analyse von Unternehmens•
rechl, 137 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR DIE GESAMTE STAATSWISSENSCHAFT 681, 683 (1981); Picot, J)er
Beilrag der Theorie der Verjligungsrechte zur okonomischen Analyse von Unternehmungsverfassungen, in K. Bohr, supra note 30, at 153, 168-69. Principal objections to the transaction cost
approach in this context are voiced in I E. GER UM & H. STEINMANN, supra note 46, at 108-12
("costs follow the constitution").
93. See, e.g., Engels, Arbeitsorientierle Unternehmensverfassung und Risikenmechanik, in K,
Bohr, supra note 30, at 199, 212-18; Glifgen, supra note 74, at 28-30.
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It has been alleged that co-determination will increase costs for labor
(salary, social benefits, job security) that cannot be sufficiently offset by improved efficiency, and that co-determination will thereby lead to competitive disadvantages vis-a-vis foreign firms. It has also been claimed that
necessary changes may be delayed, potential innovations reduced, and the
dynamics of the economy affected.94 However, these dire prognoses lose
some of their theoretical force when one considers that real markets are
imperfect and leave management with considerable room for decisionmaking. Profit maximization has long since given way to a full range of goals
pursued by the management of the large corporation, profit being a general
guideline only except in specific difficult situations when it becomes pivotal
again.
Furthermore, co-determination may have a number of positive effects
on the economy. It may lead to decisionmaking, both inside the board and
in the collective bargaining context, based on more information, which results in better decisions. Efficiency of production and economic allocation
may thereby be enhanced. More important, however, co-determination is
expected to reduce the level of conflict between capital and labor, to make
unions more cooperative and responsive, and to reduce the economic losses
that are caused by strikes and lockouts.95 The traditionally excellent German record in avoiding strikes is sometimes cited to support this last expectation. The German record, however, is due to many institutional and
other factors, and cannot be used to prove the above hypotheses. Specifically, two factors are crucial to the German success story, to wit, the character of the German trade union movement and the overall economic position
of Germany. If these factors were to change - if, for example, German codetermination were exported to a country with trade unions hostile to the
system, or if co-determination were practiced during a serious and longlasting recession - the record might very well be quite different.
C.

Societal Effects

Most difficult of all to ascertain are the societal effects that may be expected from co-determination. Differences in political and economic theory
influence any evaluation of such societal effects. This problem in evaluation is aptly illustrated by examining the antitrust concerns that co-determination has spawned. Thus, American observers of co-determination have
voiced reservations about such a system because they fear its potential for
anticompetitive effects through the presence of union members on many
boards.96 Viewed from the German experience, which relies heavily on the
94. See G. PROS!, V0LKSWIRTSCHAFTLICHE AUSWIRKUNGEN DES MITBESTIMMUNGSGESETZES 1976 (1978) (This was an opinion mandated by the shareholder side in the proceedings before the Federal Constitution Court. See note 41 supra.); Prosi, Milbeslimmung und
Innovationen, in INN0VATIONSPR0BLEME IN OST UND WEST 115-21 (A. Schiiller, H. Leipold &
H. Hamel eds. 1983) (Schriften zum Vergleich von Wirtschaftsordnungen No. 33).
95. See Glifgen, supra note 74, at 18-19, 22-23; Summers, supra note 50, at 167, 168, 184;
see also Picot, supra note 92, at 169 (at least in the short term no impairment of efficiency by
co-determination, but this could possibly be due to extraneous factors).
96. See Steuer, Employee Represenlalion on lhe Board: Industrial Democracy or lnlerlocking Directorate?, 16 C0LUM. J. TRANSNATL. L. 255, 270-74 (1977); Summers, supra note 50, at
179-83.
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societal and libertarian aspects of antitrust policy, this concern is overstated. While some scenarios of co-determination may imply such dangers,
for example, a scenario in which unions constructed information systems
about enterprises and used them on the boards of different enterprises in a
collusive way, 97 no such fears have been realized. Thus, at least at the moment, it is fair to say that the relationship between co-determination and
antitrust does not present problems in Germany. 98
Other expectations of the societal effects of co-determination are connected with two schools of thought that have been influential in postwar
German legal theory and for which Habermas and Luhmann are the main
proponents. The concept of industrial democracy, and labor's request that
it be given representation and voting power on corporate boards, may be
characterized as examples of the free dialogue ("herrschaftsfreier rational er
Diskurs"). According to Habermas and the Francfort and Erlangen school
of thought, this free dialogue, if led by equal partners in a constructive
spirit, may be the only way to modem problem-solving in philosophy, as
well as in government and in society.99 It would be too easy to dismiss this
- as has been done in the philosophical debate - by merely pointing to
the real world difficulties in creating the structural and motivational preconditions for such a dialogue on free and equal terms. Some of these difficulties have already been mentioned, and include questions as to the
professional competence of both partners, the willingness to cooperate, the
internal democracy of the employers' associations and trade unions,
whether labor has enough financial support to qualify as an equal partner,
and whether a hospitable economic and political situation exists for such a
dialogue. Yet the idea that in modem society the need for consensus is
growing, that conflicts between blocks of interests are best solved by dialogue and bargaining, has its appeal. Such problem solving may also ultimately produce better overall economic effects.
Clues as to the societal effects of co-determination are also provided by
social systems theory. The economy and single large corporations are conceived of as (sub)systems with a· relatively large degree of independence.
Systems theory as applied to the enterprise sector can draw upon the fact
that markets, as well as state intervention, fail to fulfill the governing and
steering functions that are conventionally attributed to them. One way out
of this dilemma may be to make the systems themselves responsive to other
and more general needs than their own, by organizing them in a way that
makes the pursuit of outside interests possible and even probable. In this
sense, co-determination is an instrument of societal steering by decentralized systems organization. 100 Again, it would be easy to dismiss this ap97. See Hopt, supra note 40, at 229.
98. See P. HANAU & P. ULMER, supra note 64, at Einleitung no. 7.
99. See especially Steinmann, supra note 75, at 46-48 (discussing the philosophical sources
of co-determination); Steinmann, 17ze Enterprise as Political System, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 13, at 402-05; Gl!fgen, supra note 74, at 34-35; see also H. STEINMANN & E.
GERUM, REFORM DER UNTERNEHMENSVERFASSUNG: METHODISCHE UND OKONOMJSCHE
GRUNDOBERLEGUNGEN (Abhandlungen zum deutschen und europl!ischen Handels- und
Wirtschaftsrecht No. 33, 1978) (addressing the philosophical sources of enterprise law in
general).
100. See G. Teubner, infra note 105, at 160-64 (specific reference to Luhmann). See gener•
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proach philosophically, as well as in its application to co-determination.
Indeed, the theory may be formulated in such generic terms as to make it
meaningless for practical problems, or even worse, so as to hide choices and
value judgments in seemingly neutral language. Yet the concept of decentralized steering, that is, setting up a framework for corporate organization
and decisionmaking such as co-determination, cannot be easily dismissed.
The challenge to such decentralized steering lies less in the many problems
with all alternative steering instruments, but rather in such a system's reliance on structural and procedural control mechanisms 101 and in its potential for delegalization. 102 The crucial question remains, of course, whether
performances that in classical theory have been attributed only to markets
can also be claimed for forms of enterprise organization. The evolution of
the modern corporation seems to give an affirmative answer, if one agrees
that leaving certain economic activities to the market place or internalizing
them in an intra-enterprise or intra-group structure has not been the result
of historical coincidence, but rather of economic choice and
performance. 103
IV.

CONFLICTS OF INTEREST, BOARD SECRECY, AND OTHER LEGAL
PROBLEMS

A.

Recognizing Co'!flicting Loyalties

Through the political and socioeconomic decision to mandate labor representation on corporate boards, national legislatures install the players and
set up the game. Writing the rules of the game in detail, and rendering
them compatible with other fields, is left to the lawyers and the courts. The
body of such rules is growing fast, and is the focus of attention of both
enterprises and of that part of the legal and academic profession addressing
co-determination issues. 104 The overwhelming impression garnered from
the German and other European experiences is that, contrary to what is
sometimes believed in the United States, problems arising from labor representation on corporate boards, such as conflicts of interest and threats to
board secrecy, are difficult but resolvable.
ally Teubner, Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law, 11 LAW & Socv. Rev. 239
(1983).
IOI. On this point, many participants of the Florence colloquium on corporate governance, see note 13 supra, seem to agree. See Wedderburn, supra note 14, at 44; G. TEUBNER,
supra note 90, at 166-72; Hopt, supra note 13, at 315-20; Kobler, supra note 53, at 439-41; and
Steinmann, supra note 99, at 422-25; see generally Simon, From Substantive lo Procedural Rationality, in METHOD AND APPRAISAL IN ECONOMICS 129 (S. Latsis ed. 1976); Ballwieser &
Schmidt, supra note 30, at 677.
102. See generally Galanter, Legality and its Discontents: A Preliminary Assessment ef Curren/ Theories o/ Legalization and lJelega/izalion, in ALTERNATIVE RECHTSFORMEN UND ALTERNATIVEN ZUM RECHT J J (6 JAHRBUCH FUR RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE UND RECHTSTHEORIE J J
(1980)); see also H. ZACHER, s. SIMITIS, F. KOBLER, K. HoPT & G. TEUBNER, Verrechtlichung
von Wirtschaft, Arbeit und Sozialer Solidaritlit (1984) (symposium, Bonn, Sept. 21-24, 1983).
103. See, e.g., Williamson, supra note 77.
104. For information about the struggle between German enterprise and unions over these
rules even after the affirmative decisions of the Federal Constitution Court, see sources cited in
note 41 supra;seealso Hopt, supra note 40, at 224-26. For details about the state of the law, see
P. HANAU & P. ULMER, supra note 64.
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The most obvious legal problem arising from co-determination is the
conflict of interest that it creates for labor directors. The conventional wisdom of traditional corporate law was that board members owed loyalty
only to the corporation and, directly or indirectly, to the shareholders. This
conventional wisdom never reflected the reality of large corporations, however. Indeed, there is a long history in Germany of the broadening of this
traditional concept to include other corporate goals and beneficiaries of corporate fiduciary duties. 105 Under co-determination the standard formula
used to prescribe the object of the board member's duty of loyalty is the
interest of the enterprise, whatever that may be. Opinions of what is encompassed by the interest of the enterprise range from strict profit maximization, to long-term profit optimization with wide discretion in the
board, and finally, to the explicit inclusion of external goals and interests.
The same controversies that were observed with respect to the effects of codetermination on markets and the economy apply as well to the duty of
loyalty. Thus, while there are those who want to subject management and
the board to the strict control of profit and market forces, the reality of
imperfect markets and undisputed discretion in corporate decisionmaking
seems to argue against this position.
Although much of the discussion of the conflicting loyalties of worker
board members lies within the realm of legal theory, practical answers are
needed to some important questions. For example, may a labor director
participate in decisions of the board relating to wage policy, social matters,
and industrial relations and conflicts? Or may the union member who sits
on the board actively join or even organize strikes and other measures
against the enterprise? In some jurisdictions, such as Denmark and Ireland,
legislation provides that they may do neither. In others, the delineation
between the permissible and the impermissible is extremely controversial.106 Compromise solutions, such as allowing labor directors to deliberate but not to participate in a final vote, or limiting union members to
passive participation in strikes, have been offered. If expectations of the
economic and societal benefits of co-determination are translated into legal
rules, these solutions are hardly convincing. The conflicting loyalties of the
105. For a short survey in English, see Vagts, Reforming the "Modern" Corporation: Perspectives from the German, 80 HARV. L. REV. 23, 38-43 (1966) (changing the corporate purpose). For a procedural approach, see sources cited in note IOI supra; see also A. GROSSMANN,
UNTERNEHMENSZIELE IM AKTIENRECHT (Abhandlungen zum deutschen und europllischen
Handels- und Wirtschaftsrecht No. 29, 1980); Laske, lnlerrehmensinleresse und Mitbestimmung,
8 ZGR 173, 196-200 (1979); G. Teubner, Corporate Fiduciary .Duties and Tlzeir Beneficiaries: A
Functional Approach lo the Legal Inslilulionalizalion of Corporate Responsibility, in CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE, supra note 13, at 154-55.
106. See P. HANAU & P. ULMER, supra note 64, at§ 25, Nos. 27-28, 96-98; § 26, Nos. 19-25
(containing different answers and further references); Kobler, supra note 53, at 432-38. For
England, see the discussion between Kahn-Freund, supra note 44, at 76-77, and Davies &
Wedderburn, The Land ofIndustrial .Democracy, 6 INous. L.J. 197, 200-02 (1977); see also L.
GOWER, supra note 3, at 580. For the United States, see Note, Serving Two Masters: Union
Representation on Corporate Boards of.Directors, 81 CoLUM. L. REV. 639, 656-60 (1981); Summers, supra note 50, at 165, 169-71; Comment, supra note 77, at 954. Whether the workerdirector himselfprefers to abstain or even suspend his participation in such matters is an altogether different question. UAW President Fraser did just that while on the Chrylser board, as
did the worker-directors in the German Arbed Saarstahl GmbH when drastic reorganization
measures were required.
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labor director have to be respected by not depriving him of his vote and by
not forcing him to desert his fellow union members. Otherwise the factionalization of the board members is reinforced, and the functions of the union
representative both on the board and in the union are impaired.

B. Board Secrecy: D[!ferent Standards for Shareholders' and Workers'
Representatives?

Even more controversial than the conflicting loyalties of labor members
of corporate boards is the issue of whether the traditional obligation of
maintaining board secrecy applies equally to worker-directors. In Germany, it is generally held that there cannot be different standards for shareholders' and workers' representatives to the board. This is also the express
position of the 1983 draft Fifth Directive. 107 But while board secrecy is not
much of a burden for the shareholders' representatives, 108 this is not true
for worker representatives.
Workers' representatives are expected by the work councils, the unions,
and the work force of the enterprise to report on their participation on the
board and the current problems facing the enterprise. These constituencies
expect workers' representatives to express their interest in the board and to
show that they are performing competently in their role. Even if such expectations are contrary to German law, where board secrecy is strictly upheld and informing the work force may be exclusively a decision for the
management board, 109 reality does not always correspond to this legal picture. There have been clear cases in which even highly sensitive information, such as the planned sale of an unprofitable subsidiary to another
group of companies, or plans and decisions as to cutbacks, shutdowns, and
reorganization measures, has been released prematurely.
Whether this gap between law and reality can be left open indefinitely is
questionable. Approaches to a somewhat more flexible attitude can be discerned, however. In Germany, for example, important information interests of the work force have been characterized as part of the enterprise
interest and therefore properly taken into account. This might lead to the
conclusion that such information cannot be treated as secret, so that the
information would thereby become disclosable without imposing different
standards on shareholders' and workers' directors. Furthermore, a board
member must be allowed to get expert advice if this is necessary to fulfill his
function; 110 but if the expert is not bound by professional secrecy, the board
107. See draft Fifth Directive, supra note 34, at 12.
108. This does not mean that there are no conflicts of interest, but simply that the expectations of those who send the representative to the board, like banks, major business partners,
lawyers, and other professionals, are usually different from labor. As to the difficult questions
regarding the conflict of interest of the former, see Lutter, Bankenverlreler im Az!fsichtsral, 145
ZHR 224 (1981) (Germany). For a comparative analysis, see note l supra. For the United
States, see E. HERMAN, supra note 3, at 129-37, 283-89.
109. As to the latter, see M. LUTIER, supra note 15, at 136. Bui see F.J. SACKER, lNFORMATIONSRECHTE DER BETRIEBS- UNO AUFSICHTSRATSMITGLIEDER UND GEHEIMSPHARE DES UNTERNEHMENS 82 (Schriften des Betriebs-Beraters No. 60, 1979). See generally P. HANAU & P.
ULMER, supra note 64, at§ 25, No. 99-115.
110. See Judgment of June 5, 1975, Bundesgerichtshof, 64 BGHZ 325, 331-32 (W. Ger.).
But the individual labor representative does not have the right to take an outside expert with
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member has the duty to oblige him contractually to keep the secret. These
rules are important and should not be construed too narrowly, for if codetermination is expected to have a positive economic impact by better informing the unions and the work force, it would hardly make sense to impede such an information flow with legal rules.
The difficult task is, as always, the delineation of what is secret, because
even though the need for secrecy is often exaggerated, every enterprise
needs some inner secrecy beyond the mere withholding of industrial secrets
to maintain strategic maneuverability. Sweden has come up with one interesting alternative to legal rule making in this area. There, collective bargaining may also extend to the question of what board matters shall be kept
secret. 111 Under the German model, an equivalent procedural approach
would be to leave the issue of confidentiality to the shareholders' and workers' representatives on the board to discuss and decide, but then to make
this board decision binding on all individual members. This approach
seems to have been taken in doubtful cases by the co-determined boards in
the coal and steel industry. 112
C.

Co-determination in Groups and Transnational Enterprises: Towards
the Limits of Law

Together, groups of corporations and transnational enterprises define
modem corporate reality. Regulatory ideas and corporate governance concepts meet their ultimate test with these entities. Corporate law has not yet
come to grips with groups, and is even further away with transnational enterprises.113 This is the case for Germany, with its first codified law of
groups, and for the United States, where the phenomenon of transnational
enterprises was first observed and analyzed. Co-determination is plagued
by this same inability of the law to keep pace with modem corporate reality. Problems posed by this inability in the field of co-determination are
quite challenging, but the scope of this Article permits only two final observations on the European scene. 114
First, the difficulty of installing co-determination in company groups 115
consists in finding a solution that on the one hand gives the workers, including those in the subsidiaries, effective influence on the parent corporation
him when inspecting the auditors' report of which no personal copies are given out. See Judgment of Nov. 15, 1982, Bundesgerichtshof, 85 BGHZ 293 (W. Ger.).
111. See I E. GERUM & H. STEINMANN, supra note 46, at 146-48.
112. See Enterprise Law Commission Report, supra note 8, at No. 477. There was complete disagreement about the best solution to the board secrecy problem. Id. at Nos. 461-85.
113. See sources cited in note 5 supra.
114. For details, see the abundant German literature on art. 5 of the 1976 Co-determination Act (co-determination within the group of companies) and on the territorial reach of the
Act. Some of it is recorded in P. HANAU & P. ULMER, supra note 64, vor § 5, vor § I. For
some empirical data, see Gerum, Richter & Steinmann, Vnternehmenspolitik im mitbestimmten
Konzern, 41 DIE BETRIEBSWIRTSCHAFT 345-60 (1981) (condensed version in; K. Bohr, supra
note 30, at 293-308).
115. That is, parents with control over subsidiaries. Mere financial participation and ties
do not suffice. Whether such control exists in the case of partially owned subsidiaries is as
unclear here as elsewhere in corporate law. The difference is that here a complex co-determination structure depends on an answer to this question.
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where the real decisions are made, and on the other hand does not impair
the control of the parent over the subsidiaries. The German solution, giving all workers of the group a vote for co-determination on the board of the
parent and at the same time co-determination in their subsidiary, has met
with criticism. The difficulties are increased if the parent is not subject to
co-determination, for example, because it is organized as a partnership with
the personal liability of a natural person, or because it is a foreign corporation. The German rule of treating the next highest-ranking subsidiary as a
fictitious parent for the purposes of co-determination (so-called Teilkonzem) has also been criticized by ~ost commentators. Similar difficulties
have arisen in other European countries. 116 These problems have been
considered so thorny that the European parliament has requested that most
of the Fifth Directive should not be applied to groups. Moreover, the European Commission, while rightly refusing to dilute the directive in this way,
has included in its 1983 draft an option for the Member States to postpone
applying parts of the directive until the planned Ninth Directive on Harmonization of the Law of Groups is enacted. 117
Installing effective co-determination in transnational enterprises is even
more problematic than is the case with company groups. There are two sets
of problems, one legal and one economic. The legal set is an outgrowth of
the territoriality principle, and is a well-known problem facing other national regulatory strategies such as antitrust, securities regulation, and
banking law. Beyond the usual conflicts oflaw rules, strategies to deal with
this problem are the above-mentioned Teilkonzem in German law or the
European Vredeling proposal. 118 Quite apart from these legal problems is
the question whether national legislatures are ready to assume the risk of
the possible economic consequences of a co-determination decision, to wit,
the possible exodus of transnational enterprises from the country, or at least
the strategic allocation of new foreign capital and new subsidiaries of the
transnational enterprises to competing third countries. The Dutch legislators, fully resigned to this possibility, have granted transnational enterprises
far-reaching exemptions from co-determination. 119 The Germans, on the
other hand, have not done so, and thus have taken the risk of moving ahead
in the hope that the European Communities will follow.

116. For the Netherlands, see Honee, supra note 43, at 93; van Veenroy, Konzernrecht und
Mitbestimmung in den Niederlanden, 14 ZFA 121-40 (1983). For France, see Viandier, supra
note 58. For Sweden, see Gerum & Steinmann, supra note 46, at 24, 135-43.
117. See European Parliament, supra note 33, at 43 (art. 63(a)); draft Fifth Directive, supra
note 34, at 36-37 (art. 63(b) and the reasons given for it).
118. See European Commission, supra note 59.
119. See Honee, supra note 43, at 92; Hopt, supra note 40, at 233-34 (perspectives for a
European harmonization).

